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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
UERALD J. CREASON ai1d VIOLA M.

CHEASON, aud HALLMARK CONS11HUCTORIS, INC., a corporation,

Plaintiffs-Respondents,

v.

Case No.
11878

ARN'!' LEROY PE'rERSON and RUBY

'"· PETERSON, his wife,

Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATE.MEN'l1 OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to recover damages for breach of
the covenants of a Utah statutory form of warranty
deed.
DJiSPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court. From a judgment for
the plaintiffs-respondents for $720.00 attorney's fees,
def endan ts-a<ppcllants appeal.

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment and judgment in their favor that none of the covenants were
broken, or if they 'rnre broken there was no recoverable
damage sustained by respondents. If appellants are not
entitled to that relief, appellants seek reduction of the
attorney's fees to a reasonable amount for the actual
services performed by respondents' attorney.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 20, 1963, the respondents traded appellants a new house which respondents had built at 5075
-Wesley Road, Salt Lake County, Utah, for an older
house and lot owned by appellants fronting on the East
side of 9th East at 5551 South, Salt Lake County, Utah.
It is the latter property which is the subject of this law
suit, and which ·will hereinafter be referred to as the
"subject property". Conveyance from appellants to
respondents was by a Utah statutory form of warranty
deed. (Exhibit P-2). The subject property was fenced
on all four sides and the respondent, Gerald Creason,
testified he thought he was purchasing the property
within the fence lines. (R.58) The property lies in the
Northwest eorner of a 13 acre tract formerly owned by
Joseph Thompson, who had acquired it from the patentee, -William \Vootton, in 1875. (See abstract, Exhibit
D-7, Pag·e 2, and copy of deed stapled to back cover).
See the plat below.
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Jn the warranty deed from appellants to respondents
the :,,;tarti11g point of the :,,;uhject property was described
as:
'' Begiuniug at a point in the center of 9th East
Street, Nor th 9.2 chains from the intersection of
the center lines of 9th East Street and 56th South
said point being 13.25 chains West and 9.2
chains North from the Southeast corner of the
Northeast quarter of the Northwest quarter of
Section 17, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt
I,ake l\f eridiau. ''
'l'hi:,,; :,;tarting point, "North 9.2 chains from the iutersertiou ... '' of said streets has heen referred to in all
the deeds aud other instrnments in the chain title from
1875 to the present time. Untii 1943, when the appellants
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acquired the property, this starting po·int was always
specified in all the deeds and other instruments to be
in line with an old fence, ·which fence was also described
as being the North line of the subject property. There
are 13 deeds and other instruments with this reference
to the old fence. (Pages 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 16, 20, 21,
22 and 26 of abstract)
After acquiring the subject property from the appellants, respondents re-sold it to the Sievert·s Brothers.
Thereafter, SieYerts raised the question with respondents whether the old line of fence which ran along
the orth side of the property was the true deed line.
A survey was made by Coon & King and from that survey two plats were prepared by them, both of which were
int11oduced into evidence at the trial. The first survey
plat made by Coon & King (Exhibit P-4) showed that
both the starting point of the deed description (which is
at the Northwest corner of the subject property) and
the North deed line were 6.5 feet North of the old fence
line and int 0 property owned by Arion Erekson. The
second plat (Exhibit P-3) which was also made by Coon
& King after Bush & Gudgell had discovered an error in
their first plat, showed the deed line to be 4.5 feet North
of the fence. The latter plat ( P-3) showed the fence on
the South of the property fo be South of the deed line
about the same or a greater distance as the discrepancy
on the North, except at the frontage. The rear or East
fence was shown to be between 2 and 3 feet beyond the
East deed line. It was undisputed that Exhibit P-3 showed
39,561 square feet to be encliosed by the fences, whereas
1
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there were only :38,874 square feet enclosed by the deed
line .
Hespondent Crea:,;on testified that he requested permission from Arion Erekson to move the old fence line
North to one of the survey line:,;, but Erekson refused
( R.66) be ca u:,;e the ol<l fence had stood in the same plaee
:,,ince before 1920, when Erekson moved upon hi:,; property, and its location hall Bever been questioned. Hedid not pursue the matter \Yith Erekson, but
to satisfy Sieverts they obtained a quitclaim deed to the
area hetween the deed line and fence line on the East of
the subject property from George Ferguson and Edith
Ferguson, his wife, and also chtained quitelaim deeds
to the area between the South deed line and the South
fence from Tad Aoki arnl Harriet Alpaugh 's estate, who
were the owners to the South. Aoki was pun·hasing that
under contract from Alpaugh. Respondents
then brought this action against appellants for breach
of the "covenants under the warranty deed", hut did not
which of the five statutory covenants it claimed
\Yere broken. The ease was tried before the Honorable
Leonard vV. Elton, sitting "·ithout a jury, on "May 16,
1969. The eourt coneluded that appellants brearhed the
"covenants of title" under the warranty deed, (R.29)
hut did not specify whieh covenant or covenants were
hrnkE•n. The coul't found that "the
as described in the subject warranty deed did not eoincide
with the fence lines on the subject property'', (R.20)
and eoncluded that the 9th East frontage was l.93 feet
<l0ficient, and that appellants had failed to deliver
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''clear title'' to the tract. ( R.29) No damages were proved
for the alleged 1.93 feet deficiency of frontage, and the
court allowed no damages therefor. The only damage
which the court allowed was $720.00 attorney's fees allegedly paid by respondents to their attorney for ''quieting title'', which presumably means obtaining the three
quitclaim deeds heretofore mentioned and two satisfactions of judgment against Aoki, which Aoki had paiu
but had not been satisfied of record. No quiet title action was ever brought by respondents against anyone.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
rrHERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT FINDING OF FACT NO. 5 THAT THE
''PROPERTY AS DESCRIBED IN THE SUBJECT
WARRANTY DEED DID NOT COINCIDE WITH
THE FENCE LINES ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.''
POINT II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT THE COMMENCEMENT POINT OF THE
DESCRIPTION WAS IN LINE WITH THE OLD
NORTH FENCE LINE, AND THAT THE NORTH
LINE OF THE DESCRIPTION "'WAS ALONG THE
OLD NORTH FENCE LINE.
POINT III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING
IN CONCLUSION OF LAW NO. 1 THAT APPEJ,_
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TIE1S.

BREACHED rrHE UOVENAN'r8 OF Tl11 LE
WARRANTY DEED
THE PAR-

The above points will be treated together, since they
all relate to the location of the cornrnencerneut point of
the de:::>cription in the warranty deed from appellants to
nc spnciJic Jin<ling- :u
respondents. ·white the court
to the location of the starting point, the court apparently
toncluded that it began North of the old fence line in
land possessed by Arion Erekson. Counsel uses the word
"apparently" because Finding of Fact No. 8 seems to be
i11 eonflioi with that conclusion. Finding of Fact No. 8
states that the <lescriptiou \Vas "clear and unambiguous
in its terms and conveyed the property which the defendants intended to convey to plaintiffs". There never was
any question but that all parties thought they were selling an<l lrnyiug the property within the fences. Respondent Creas·on so testified. (R.58) Certainly the appellants, Petersous, did not intend to sell property North
of the O'ld fence they had never possessed. Arnt Petersou
and his wife, Ruby Peterson, both testified that they had
110 kuo\\'ledge that the North fence was not on the deed
li11e. ( R.152, 164, 165) If the description conveyed the
la ml the parties intended, then there certainly should
not haYe been any judgment entered for the plaintiffs.
Kor is there any evidence whieh justified the court
below in concluding that there had been a breach of the
covenants in the warranty deed. Sec. 57-1-12, U.C.A. 1953,
p1•0,·ides that om statutory form of warranty deed contnins five covenants, hut the lower court did not specify
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\rhirh 'Ones it found broken. The only reference to covenants is contained in Conclusion of Law No. 1 which
reads:
"Defendants breaehe<l co\·euants of title under
the subject warranty deed <lated December 20,
1963, in that they failed to deliver to plaintiffs
the full street frontage of land described in said
deed and wholly failed to cionvey a clear title to
the tract conveyed thereby.''
A·s heretofore mentioned, 110 damage was proved because of the alleged 1.93 feet of frontage deficienry, and
the court a warded no damages to respondents for such
deficiency. There could be no damage because respondents actually received 687 more square feet of land than
their description called for, (R.143-144), and the pr·Operty was not zoned commercial and was not sold by the
front foot. (R.166-167) Respondents have not filed a
eross-appeal from the judgment and thus that question
(ff damages is not an issue before this eourt. That leaves
only the matter of whether appellants failed to convey
it is not specified wherein the title
a "clear title".
was not clear, presumably this Condusion of Law No. 1
has reference to Finding of F'aet No. 5 that the fence
lines and deed lines did not coincide. As will be hereinafter pointed out in Point IV of this argument, even if
appe'llants did fail to eonny a elear title, it would not,
without more, constitute a breach of any covenant since
the grantee must he evicted by someone with paramount
title who successfully asserts the same. That never oerurred here.
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Tlie only testirno11y adduced by respondents that the
!·"nee ; nes and deed lines did not coincide came from
i{olJert .J 011es, a surveyor employed Ly Bush & Uudgell.
I le teslili.ed that Coon & King made a survey of the subje<'l property 1,11 February 1:Z, 1964, and prepared a
plat, Kxhibit l'-4. lilr. Creason, one ·of the respondents,

hrnught the plat to .Jo11es for him to eheek it. (H.13)
,Jones did not personally go to the r:mbject pruperty to
,·!Jeck it, ht1t seul a crew out \\'hid1 reported back to him
that they [ouml a t\\'o aml a fraction foot error in Coc,11
:'- l\:ing':,; lucalio11 of

Charles

till'

:-;tarti11g poiut Jones eontacted

of Cu:Jll & Ki11g, \\·ho reportedly sent his

lJ<ll·k Olli lo
check it a11d :-;11bsta11tiated the
error. (H.16) King appare11Hy agreed that he had erred
ne\1·

aud preparetl a 11ew plat (Exhibit

lo ref1ect the

1·1HTectio11 of his error. 'l'he error was a mistake in measuring Korth !U chai11s from the eenter of the intersecti, n or .J(iOO South a11J 9th East. (R.S:Z) Because Jones
nen•r personally we11t to the subjed property, everythi11g hL• testified to was based upon what his field ere\\.
reported to him after they came baek. (R.79) He testiJied that there had been set a County Surveyor's monu111e11 t in the il\,tersection (R.71) and he asswned that that
rno11ument was used hy Coon & King both times they
-;uneyed the subject property, but he was not positive.
m.8:2) He thought his crew Uiied the
mom1ment "as far as

Surveyor's

knuwledge goes" (R.S:J), but

did not know for sure. (R79)
'l'he location of the starting point of the fleseriptio11
11 n s r ne of the issues at the trial. The acC'uracy of Exhihi t

9

P-3 an<l P-4 were questioned at the trial. (R.64, 73, 74)
Yet no one from Coon & King testified at the trial as to
their accuracy nor where they began to measure the 9.:2
diains to the commencement P'Oint. Jones attempted to
supply the missing testimony, but he had no first hand
knowledge since he did not personally go to the subject
property. He had only hearsay information supplied him
by his field erew. The testimony of Jones was clearly i11rnfficient to support the ccurt 's Finding of Fact No. 8
that the property as described in the subject warranty
deed did not coincide with the fence lines on the subject
property.
On the other hand, appellants produced an abstract
on the property, Exhibit D-7, showing that the description used by the parties was the same description used
when appellants purchased the property in 1943. (Pg.
28, Exhibit D-7) The starting point of this description
is au ancient point, having appeared first in the deed
from William Wootton, the patentee, to Joseph Thomps·on in 1875. (Page 2 of UJbstract and copy of that deed
inserted in end of abstract, Exhibit D-7). In each succeeding conveyance (Pages 3, 7, 8, 9, 13, 26, 28) there is
reference to the point "9.2 chains North of the interseetion of the icenter lines of 9th East and 56th South''.
The same reference is found in the mortgages and other
instruments at Pages 10, 14, 16, 20, 21, and 22. In every
instance that point is designated as being in line with an
old fence line, until 1943 when appellants purchased the
subject property. In the conveyance to appellants there
"-as no reference to the old fence line, presumably be-
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tlic de.,;eriptio11 was copied from au alJlireYiate<l
LtX HoL,'<:. 'rhere is no evidence that the parties i11teu1101wily failed to refer to it as found in Finding of Fact
l\eitlier party hm; enr elaimcd that. The evidenee
is uncontr•overted that the old fence had remained intaet
aml uudurnged for more than 4D year.,;, right down to the
date of trial. Arion Erekson, who O\\·ns tl1e property to
the X orth of the subject pruperty, testified that when he
first moved to his property 011 April 15, 1D20, there wa.,;
an old fence standing ( H.121) and that it still stands
there in the same place (R.124), although it has been
rebuilt several times. He was certain because the fence
runs along a high ditch bank, which had also remained
mwhanged since 1920. (R.134) Ruby Peterson, one of
tlic appellants, likewise testified that she was now 58
)"Cars of age; that when she was 10 or 11 years old she
.!..'.all1ncd in the c(,\\·s for
Alpaugh to milk; that the
fence on the North side of the subjed property "went
on the Korth side of the ditch exactly as it does today".
(R.152) Mr. Peterson, her husband, testified that he had
rc:,ii<led upon the subject property from 1943 to the date
of sale to respondents; that the fence had been re-built
lint along the same line as the old fence. (R.1G5) On crossexamination he stated that because of the high ditch
hank, "if you moved the fence you would luwe to
it tPn foct either way". (R.169)
'l'his fence line to which these three witnesses reCcrrecl is the identical one to whieh thirteen successive
references have been made in the chain of title as running North 89° F:ast 13.50 chains (891 feet) from 9th
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East Street. Erekson testified it ran East about 900 feet
from 9th East along his South boundary. (R.123) The
fact that the fence line was not specifically mentioned in
the description in the deed by which the appellants acquired title in 1943, nor in the description in the deed
from appellants to respondents in 1963, is inconsequential. At the time of both cionveyances the fence was there
in the same place where it had stood unehanged since
before 1920. Respondents did uot and could not produce
any evidence that the fence had ever been moved. Respondent Creason himself testified that it looked like an
iold fence. (R.58) Certainly neither appellants nor respondents intended to sell or buy any part of Erekson's
property Nor th of the old fence. ( R.152, 164, 165) All
the parties thought that the fence was the North boundary of the subject property. Respondent Creason testified he thought he was buying the prcperty within the
fence lines (R.58) The lower court erred in not holding
that the starting point of the description was in line with
the old fence line, and erred in not holding that the old
North fence line constituted the North boundary of the
property in law. This failure was error for several
reasons.
First, there were not in existence at the time of the
Coon & King survey any monuments used in the original
survey of the subject property, er any monuments of
any succeeding surveys ·which might have been made,
except for the old fence lines. A monument in the intersection of 9th East and 56th 1South was set by the County
Surveyor in a1bout 1946 to 1948. (R. 126) This was three
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year:o after appellant:,; ha<l pmdiase<l the pruperty iu
1:;4;), at which time they had had the property surveyed
and 110 prcblem was fouud to exist. (R.151) Re::>pondents'
witness, Robert Jones, who <lid not go to ur upon the
subjeet property, but whose cre'v checked and found the
t:nor of (;oon & King's HJG.J: survey (Exhibit P-4), did
11ot personally lrnow whether Coon & Kiug· used thi::;
monument as their starting point (H.82), nor <lid he
per::;unally know whether his fiel<l crew nsecl that monumeu t Io chain fr um i11 checki11g the Uoon & King survey.
(R
.Jones further testified that his ('rew made no
attempt to l1o('ate the center of tlie intersection by chaining ". e:-;t l'rom the Southeast ('Orner d the X ortheast
quarter of the
quartl>r of Section 17 (hereinafter referred to as the lGth corner) as called for in the
<les<·ription. ( K80) He further testified that many times
"lie!i old mo11uments are attempted to Le re-established
as the 011e here Het
tlie Couut,v Surveyor, they
do 110t agree ,yjth cl<l existing fence lines which were
estalJliHhe<l in accordance \vith earlier surveys. (R.83)
He a<'knowledged that in surveying it is proper to refer
to earlier deeds in the ehaiu of ti11e to see if a call is made
lo a fence, but that in this instance he did not have the
lwuefit of the abstract. (R.89-90) .Jones acknowledged
that the center of au intersecticn might change in the
eomsc of 80 years and that his cletermination of where
that point is toda:v would not 11eC'essarily he the same as
ii \\'as in 187;'). (R.82) All
agreed that they do
not
to lorate where a property line in law would he.
(R.81, BG, H4)
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Prior to l!:J46, there was no rnouument of any sort in
the center of the intersection. 'l'here were road st·one8 at
the four corners of the intersect.ion but these were set
in 1896, 21 years after the first survey when Thompson
purchased it from the patentee, \,Vootton. (R127) In
view of this lack of 1original or even old monuments at
either the intersection or at the 16th corner referred to
in the description, other monuments must be looked to
to locate the starting point ·of the subject property. 'fhe
best and only evidence is the old fence line running along
the North side of the subject property, which is referred
to throughout the chain of •title and which has stood without change since before 1920. Robert Goff, surveyor for
appellants, testified that prior to the seHing of the road
the only monuments were fences which vrnre set
in accordance with early suneys. (R.127)
Because original monuments become destroyed and
surveyor's instruments become more exact and accurate,
it is the duty of the surveyor when tracing an ancient
descripti.on such as that used here, to follow the footsteps
of the original surveyor who laid ·out the corners. (" 1ashington Rock Co. v. Young, 29 U t. 109, 80 Pac. 382; 12
Arn. J ur 2d, Sec. 61 ou Boundaries) This can be done
giving effect to old fences which \rnre presumably established in accordance with early surveys, and by giving
effect t•o the nse and conduct of the landowners and their
predecessors in title. In such eases the old fenee iotself
is recognized as a controHing monument. Such was tile
holding of this court in the case of Reese v. Murdock, 121
Ut. 517, 243 P. 2d 948. That case involved the location of
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Jlw. i;1rliug µoi11l of a lot lyi11g i11 tl11• Soutl1eac;t cornl'r

\>f tbe 1:3 acre Thompson trad from \Yhic-h the subjl'et

property was also earved. 'rhc beginning poiut was deseribed as the same 16th corner \\·hic-11 is l'ound in tl1l'
description in the instant ease, to-wit, the Southeast c1Jr11er of the Northeast quarter of the North\YCst quarter
111'
11. 111 that case t\V'O prin1te surn:·;ors placell
1lie starting point 1:2 feet \Yest o[' an old fenC'e lim• and
fence corner which had stood many years wi th1 ut qucs1io11 ;is lhl' East honrnlar,\· of the property. The Co1mt:·
Surveyior surveyed the property and established tl1c lwpoint :io feet \\"est of saicl old fcnee li11e. See the
plat hclow .
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lt was contended in that case, as it is by respondents ii.
this case, that one of the surveyed points of beginning
must be adopted by the court as the point of beginning.
This court rejected that contention holding that because
the monuments of the original survey were gone and
were lost, the next best evidenee of the starting point
was the old fence line which presumably was built in accordance with an early survey. This court rejected all
surveyed points of beginning and adopted the old fence
line, which had been regarded by all 1owners as the East
boundary of the property.
tiaid this court,
"The evidence of where that point (beginning
point) was according to the original survey establishing that point or as re-establishing it is
very uncertain. There is evidence that this fente
line has marked the Eastern boundary of this
property which has been held without dispute by
the predecessors of plaintiffs and defendants for
more than 50 years .... There are no monuments
on the ground which indicate where the starting
point was located either by the original or the
re-established survey except this old fence .... All
of the parties concerned in purchasing· this property understood that this fence line was the Eastern boundary line of the property."
The instant case is even stronger on its facts for
application of the rule of Reese v. l\f urdock because (1)
in Reese v. Murdock there was never any reference in
the chain of title to the starting p·oint and East boundary
line as beiing on a fence line, whereas, in the instant case
there are no less than thirteen references in the abstract
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from 18'i.) to 1943 to the old fence line as being the Nor th
boundary, and (2) the fence line adopted by the court
in Heese v. .Murdock was 12 feet to 30 feet outside and
beyond the surveyed deed line, whereas, in the instant
case the fence line is 4.5 feet within the surveyed line.
As early as 1905, this court in W ashinglion Rock Co.
v. 1 oung, 29 Ut. 108, 118, 80 Pac. 382, stated," The law is
well settled that an original survey of lands, upon the
fate of which property rights have been based and acquired, contnols over surveys subsequently made which
injuriously affect such rig·hts' '. It quoted with approval
from Hess v. Meyer, 73 Mich. 259, 41 NW 422, wherein
it was said, "If the stakes or monuments placed by the
government in making the survey to indicate the section
eorners and quarter posts can be found, or the places
where they >Originally were placed can be identified, they
are to control in all cases. When they cannot be found,
or if lost or ohliterated, they must be restored upon the
vest evidence obtainable which tends to prove where they
originally were. For this purpose surveys are made and
lines re-traced as near as possible". (Italics added).
This court then went on to state,
"In such ca,ses junior or subsequent surveys
are not made to dispute the eorrectness of or to
eontrol the original
but to furnish legitimate proof of where the lost lines or monuments
were so as to aid the jury in determining the
exad lo,cation of the original survey. It seems
clear, therefore, that in making such junior surveys the original survey should be re-traced,
where possible .... An original survey upon which
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vroperty rights have been acquired, cannot thus
be changed or diminished or obliterated, w! th so
little regard for existing evidence."
The decisions of this court in Heese v . .Murdock and
\Yashington Rock Co. v. Young are in accordance with
well recognized law on this point. In 12 Am. Jur 2d on
Boundaries, Sec. Gl, entitled ''Resurveys'', it is written:
''In surveying a tract of land according to a
former plat or survey, the surveyor '·s ·only duty
is to relocate, upon the best evidence obtainable,
the courses and lines at the same place where
originally located by the first surveyor on the
ground. In making the survey, he has the right
to use the notes of the original survey. The object
of a resurvey is to furnish proof of the location of
the lo-st lines or monuments, not to dispute the
0orrectness of or to control the original survey.
The original survey in all cases must, whenever
possible, be retraced, since it cannot be disregarded or needlessly altered after property rights
have been acquired in reliance upon it. On a resurvey to establi sh lost boundaries, if the original
corners can he found, the places where they were
originally established are conclusive without regard to whether they were in fact correctly located,
in this respect it has been stated that the rule is
based on the premise that the stability of boundary lines i·s more important than minor inaccuracies or mistakes. But it has also been said that
great eaution must be nsed in reference to resurveys, since surveys made hy different surveyors
seldom wholly agree. A resurvey not shown to
have been based upon the original survey is inconclusive in determining boundaries and will
ordinarily yieild to a resurvey based upon known
1
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monuments and boundaries of the original survey''.

111 the irn;taut case the trial eourt disregarded the
best aml only ev;idence obtainable as to the original location of tlie starting point and the North boundary of the
subject p1ioperty. Although he made no finding as to the
location of the starting point of the property, nor made
any finding as to the location of the North line of the subject property, and refused to do so when such omission
wat'i called to his attention in appellants' Motion to
.\mend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, (R.32)
J1c apparently coneluded that the surveyed line over in
Erckson 's property was the North line of the subject
µruperty, sinec in Finding of Fact No. 5 he found, "that
I lie property deseribed in the subject warranty deed did
not coincide with the fence lines on the subject property''.
Had he used the old fenee as the starting point and
the North line, the fences would then coincide with the
deed lines except on the East and Southeast where the
fonr'e:-; took in too much footage ... all to the benefit of
the respondents. In this regard appellants call attention
to the text of 8eotion il, entitled "Ancient Fences", 12
Am ..Jud. 2d on Boundaries. There is stated in part:
'' Ancieut fern·es used by a surveyor in his attern pt tn reproduce an old survey are strong evidenee of the location of the original lines and, if
theY have been standing for rnanv Years, should
lw ·taken as indicating 'sneh lines.
against the
evidence of a survev which ignores such fences
nnd is lrnsed npon a·n assumed starting point. It
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is said that a long estaulished fence is betfor e•::
dence of actual boundaries settled by practical
location than any surveys made after the monuments of the original survey have disappeared.
Accordingly, a fence erected on a surveyed line
shortly after the land has been surveyed may
serve as a monument to control courses and distances or a subsequent survey after the stakes set
out ai the time of the original survey have disappeared.''
'rhe text cites the following cases in support: F. H.
\Volf Brick Company v. Lonyo, 132 .Mich. 162, 93 N".
231, and Wacker v. Price, ( 1950) 70 Ariz. 99, 216 P. 2d
707.

In the \Vacker case just cited, the court quoited in ib
opinion with approval from 110 Am. St. Rep. 681, under
the title of "Resurveys and Their Purpose and Effect":
"In Diehl v . .Z.anger, 39 :.Mich. 601, where the
first survey of lots involved in litigation was
made by one Campau, and a resurvey made years
afterward by the City Surveyor showed that the
practical location of the whole plat was wrong, it
was declared that a resurvey made after the disappearance of the monuments of the original
survey is for the purpose of determining where
they were, and not where they should have been,
an<l that a long established fence is hetter eYidnce of actual boundaries settled by pradieal loeation than any survey made after the monuments
of the original survey have disappeared. 'Nothing
is better understood', said Justice Cooley in delivering the opinion of the court, 'than that few
of our early plats will stand the test of a careful
and aecurate survey without disclosing- errors.
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·fl1is is true of the government surveys as well
as any others, and if all the lines were now subject
to correction on new surveys, the confusion uf
lines and titles that would follow would be simply
incalculable and the visitation of the surveyor
might well he set down as a great public calamity.
But no law can sanction this course. The City
8urveyor has mistaken entirely the point to which
his attention should have directed. The question
is not how an entirely accurate survey would locate these lots, hut how the origi.nai stake·s located them .... The City Surveyor should, therefore, have directed his attention to the ascertaining of the actual location of the original landmarks set by Mr. Campau, and when those were
discovered they must govern. If they are no
longer discoverable, the question is where they
were located; and upon that question the best
possible evidence is usually found in the practical
location of the lines made at a time when the
oriµ;inal monuments were presumably in existence
nnd probably known. Stewart v. Carlton, 31 Mich.
:270. As between old boundary f enees, and any
survey made after the monuments have disappeared, the fences are far the better evidence of
what t11e lines of the location actually are'."
'l'he Arizona court stated, "that it is a matter of
rnmmon knowledge that the great majority of original
surveys are more or less inaccurate, and since it has al\Yays been the rule that courts must resort and be bound
hy the best evidence available, it follows that the boundaries fixed by the property owners themselves in the
absenre of the inability of surveyors to definiiely fix the
monuments fr1Qm which the original survey was made,
must control ... ".
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ln a coucurring opmwn rn the Wacker case, Judge
Phelps stated that in the absence of 1110numents l'rom
which the original survey was made, the fences along
the sidelines of the lot themselyes may be treated
monuments.
'l'here is an additional reason \Yhy the court should
have found the North boundary of the subject property
to be the old fenee line. The starting point is <lesnibc<l
as, "Beginning in the center of 9th East Street, X orth
9.:2 ehains from the intersection of the center lines of 9th
East Street and :->Gth South Street, :,;aid point being 1::3.23
chains vYest and 9.:2 ehains or1h from the
<'Orner of the Northeast quarter of the K orthwest quarter of Section 17' '. Douglas Brammer, Chief Deputy i11
the Salt Lake County Surveyor's Office, testified that
this beginning point left "s-0me question" a:,; to how you
arrive at it. (R. 141) To illustrate thi:,; doubt, he made a
drawing, Exhibit D-G, which shows that starting at the
1Gth eorner and coming true "'est 13.:2;) <'ha ins, yon
would arrive approximately 10.9 feet South of the center
of tlw intersection as it is :,;hown 011 the eonnty referem·t·
plat. (R.142-143) However, if you came on the bearing
of North 89°17'35" West along the center of 56th South,
would arrive at the center of the intersection as it
rxists today. Thus, a doubt is raised as to \Yhat is intended by the description hecansc it can he interpreted
two different ways. (R.14-7-148)
the' 16th line
nor the center of 56th South runs true East and West
(R.148); yet the description as contained in early deeds
(Pages 2, 3, 7 anrl 8 of ahstrad state: "Thence true "West
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a1oug the centre of County Road on South line of said
fody Thirte\.:n Chains Twenty Five Links (13.25) ".
1ltalics ad<le<l) Hobert Uoff, a licensed surveyor called
to testify by the appellants, corroborated .Jilr. Brammer
and testified that the center of 56th .-::;outh and the 16th
line do not coincide or even parallel each other. (R.129)
Ile te:,;tified that at 13th East, the 16th line was in the
North half of 56th South Street, but that at Vine Street
(750 East) the 16th line is in the South half of that street,
and that :,;omewhere between those two points the two
lines cr'oss each other. He further testified that the survey plat of Cook & King, Exhibit P-3, suggests to him
that a point South of the present center of the intersections of the two streets was used when the fences were
put in. (R.130) He further testified that it should be
assumed that fences which are established have been
'urrnye<l in their location, (R.137) and that survey lines
are not 11ecessarily legal property lines, (R.136) and that
prior to the setting of the roadstones at the four corners
1,f the intersection on
14, 1896, the only monuments \\·ere fences which were set in accordance with
(R.127)
To say the least, the starting point contained in the
warranty deed was ambiguous and pri<>r deeds
in the c-hain of title should be looked to to clear up the
ambiguity. In Sec. 100-h on Deeds, 26 CJS, Page 874, it
i:;; stated:

"It has been held or recognized that, where the
trrms of a <lee<l are amhiguons or uncrrtain in
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<lescribing land conveyed, a prior deed in the
chain of title may be looked to to secure the trl.e
description",
eiting Jones v. Johnson, 305 Ky. 325, 204 8. \\'. 2d %1,
which held that an omission in a subsequent description
cannot enlarge the boundaries of land conveyed by dee<l.
If prior deeds in this chain of title are looked to to secure
the true description, we find on 13 occasions the call to
the old North fence line which firmly fixes the North
houndary of the subject property. Because the deed to
rnspondents faile<l to mention it did not authorize the
trial court to disregard the fence and enlarge the desCJ·iptiou. The lower court erred in disregarding this
an<'icnt monument. It failed to recognize the best evidence of the existence of the starting point and North
bouncla ry of the subject property, viz., the old North
fonec line which had been referred to in deeds since 1875,
n ml which when followed gave the respondents 687 more
square feet than their description actually ealled for.
The i·espondents themselves recognized this when they
did not pursue Erekson but adopted the fence line,
thcrel)y getting more square footage than had the deed
lines been followed. No outsider made any claim to the
property within the fences, and no one ever disturbed
respondents' possession. If there was any error with the
fence lines it was not with the North fence but with the
East and South fence which encompassed more area
than they should have. This was all to the benefit of the
respondents who received more land than they had actually bargained for. No covenant is broken when the
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iPJlf'.es e1.r,oiupas8 tou much ground, as the grantees <:an

:::.,·ic.11:-:ly nHn·e the fences hack.

POINT IV.
'rHE LOWER COUHT ERRED IN CONCLUDING
'rHERE \VA8 A BREACH OF WARRANTY BECAU8E 'rlIE 'l'ITLE \\'A8 NOT CLEAR.
Although the trial court did not specify which covenant or covenants it found to have been broken, it stated
iu Conclusion of Law No. 1 that appellants breached the
eove11ant8 of title because they had ''failed to convey a
dear title". (H.29) This would indicate that the court
thought that the covenants for quiet enjoyment and of
1rnrranty were broken. If this was the court's conclusion,
it \\'as erroneous because they are not broken merely by
the existence of au unclear or clouded title. These coveuauts are uot broken until the grantee is evicted, either
actually or eoustructively, by someone with a superior
or paramount title. Sec. 57-1-12, U.C.A. 1953, provides
the following with respect to the use of our statutory
form of warranty deed:
'' 8uch deed when executed as required by law
shall have the effect of a conveyance in fee simple
to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, of the premises therein named, together with all the appurtenances, rights and privileges thereunto belonging, with covenants from the grantor, his heirs
and personal representatives, that he is lawfully
seized of the premises; that he has good right to
convey the same; that he guarantees the grantee,
11is heirs and assigns in the quiet possession
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thereof; that tlie premises are free from ;111
cumbrances; an<l that the grantor, hi::; heirs and
personal representatives will forever warrant
and defend the title thereof in the grantee, hi,
heirs a11d assigns, agai11.sf all lawful claims zchat.suci·er. Any exceptions to sud1 covenants may be
hricfiy insertc<l in such deed following the description of the land". (Italics added)

1t shc.ulJ he 11otcll that the above section
upon the granior the duty of forever warranting allll
<lefendiug the title i11 the grantee agaiust all la·w/ul
claims. lt does 11ut say that tl1e grantor will warrant awl
defend against auy claim or against unlawful claims. 111
Sc<". 101J, Tiffany on Real Property, the author states:
''Covenants f1or quiet enjoyment and of warranty are equivalent. They are broken only \\-he11
the disturban('c of the grantee's enjoyment is hy
the grant or or by a third person under lawful
claim of title".

Iu the same work in Sec. 1013, it is stated:
"In order for there to be a breach of warrant)·
or of quiet enjoyment by reason of a paramuunt
title in another, an eviction of the covcnantee by
such other is ordinarily necessary. Tile existence
of an invalid an<l unenforceable claim is not a
breach, even th1.ug-h it
c·onstitut0 a cloud 011
the title".
This court in Baumgarten v. Chipman, 30 Utah 4G6.
8G Pac. 411, held that in an action fur hreaeh of covenant
of warrant;\·, the grantee must show that he \\"HS evicted
from the land conveyed by someone with a paramount
title and that the grantor had notice of that snit so that
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l:r h:Jcl an opportunity to be heard on the question of

wlle1 her his title or the other party's title was paramount.
the above law to the instant case, the recontended in thP lower court that there had
been a breach of covenant:,; because a strip, 4.5 feet in
1ridth lying Korth cf the old North fence line, was in the
posses:-;ion of Arion ]i;rekson. As had been pointed out
under Points l, II, and 111 in this brief, appellants have
demom;trnted that the deseription for the 89 years prior
lo the respundents' purchase had never been construed
1o iuelude any land North of the fence line, and should
nut now be so construed. However, if this court does not
aµ,reP "·ith appellants in that regard, then the question of
111rnend1ip of the strip Lecomes important. Appellants
rnay \\ell own said strip if it lie::; within their description
8iJH'e tl1(•y and their predecessors liave been paying taxes
on it
though Erekson and his predecessors have
lieeu i11 possession. Appellants do not admit and have
11e\'Pr admitted that Erekson has paramount title to the
,,trip. 'I'he question of ownership has never been determined either in this action or any prior action because
re8poudents chose not to pursue it. But before being saddled with liability for breach of warranty, appellants
1·ertai11l:'' want an opportunity for a day in court when it
i::J judicially determined who is the owner. Until, how1·1·er, there is a determination adverse to the title 0on\'eyed, respondents have no cause of action against
appellants on the covenants of warranty. Such adverse
drtPrmination was require<l of the grantee, Van C10tt, in
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the case of Van Cott v. Jacklin, 63 LT tah 412, 226 Pac. 460.
There, it first had been detennined in a suit
\"aii
Cott and Casper, an adjoining owner, that Casper ha<l
the paramount title to the strip there in questi1 11 which
had been conveyed to Van Cott. See Van Cott v. Casper, 53 Utah 161, 176 Pac. 849. Thereafter, Vau Cott
lwought an action against hi:,; grantor, Jacklin, for breach
of warranty. This court required .Jacklin to indemnify
Van Cott for damages sustained in view of the prior
unsuccessful suit with Casper. Hau Van Cott won the
suit against Ca8per, Van Cott would have had no eause
of action against Jacklin because 110 <"ovewrnt would
have been broken.
Respondents are, therefon•, premature in hringing
suit against their grantors, the appellants, fer hreacb
of covenants. They have had no litigation with Erekson
who they now assert has paramount title to the 4.5 foot
strip. Until Erekson's paramount title has been judicially determined, they have no eause of adion agaimt
appellants. As stated by the above authorities, the existence of an invalid and unenforceable claim is not a
breach, even though it may cloud the title. The statement
in Conclusion of Law No. 1 that there was a breach of
warranty because the title was not clear is a legal non
sequitur.
If the lower court concluded that the covenant against
encumbrances was broken, it was in error since thi;;
eourt in the case of Utah Savings & Trust v. Stoutt, :36
Utah 212, 102 Pac. 865, held that such coYenant contern-
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platP that there must be a lien or rnlid elaim against
1he property. The mere assertion of a claim is not
1·11ough, and umnarketability of title is not encugh.
POINT V.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
ATTORNEY'S J;,EES IXCURRED
fK OBTAINING QUITCLAIM DEEDS F'ROl\l AD.JOINING OWNERS ON THE SOUTH AND EAST.
The only damages awarded respondents in this action
were $720.00 for attorney's fees in "quieting title".
(Finding of :B'act No. 7, R.28) Since they did not bring
llll.Y quiet title action, this finding presumably means
obtaining the three quitclaim deeds and the two satisfaetiiom; of judgment from adjoining owners. Appellants
have heretofore pointed out in this brief under Points
1. II, and III that there were no encumbrances or clouds
on the title and it is, therefore, our position that there
waR no need to obtain the quitclaim deeds. Assuming,
however, that there were clouds on the title, no cases
hllve been found where 3Jttorney 's fees were allowed a
grautel'-eovenantee for dearing clouds. In fact, the
authorities are unanimous that attorney's fees will not
he allowed in such instances. In 20 Am. ,J ur. 2d, Ser. 151
on Covenants, Page 710, it is stated:
"Thus sinee a C'ovenant of warranty does not
protect against every unfounded adverse elaim
hut is broken onlv where there is actual or constructive eviction. under a paramount title, thP
covenantee is not entitled to demand of his covenantor expenses incurred in the defense of a suit
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which sustains the title a::; valid. The fact that
there is an apµare11t cloud upon the title is 11 u1
enough, but its ualidity inust be shown to cstaf;lis/i
the Lrnr rant or's liability. " (Italic::; added)
ln an annotation on this subject at Gl A.L.H. lGU, the
same rule is stated, viz. that attorney's fees incunc<l in
remo\·ing douds from the title are not chargeaLle against
Lasetl upon breach of covenants:
the grant or in an

··A eonmaut i::; a coutrad of iu<lcmnity
lu8::; hecau::;e of a defective title, and uot a oontract to indemnify the covenantee against
from the unfounded assertion of claims against
the title; hence, auy expenditures in defending
the title agai1rnt su('h claims cannot be recovered
for on the g1iound of liability under the covenanb
(citing Hoffman v. Dickson, G5 \\'ash. 556, 118
Pac. 737, and Smith v. Parsons, 3:J \\'.Ya. ()44, 11
S.E. 68). Under a warranty extending fo lawful

claims o itly, expe,11ses incurred -in def endiu,ry
a9ainst a11 unfounded claim cannot be reco·vered
from those bound by the warranty. The fact that
there is an appare11t cloud upon the title is 1101
enough. Its validity must be showu to establish
the liability of the u;arrantor. (Citing
'"

Clark, 80 N.ll. 577, 120 Atlan. 433). So where
there are clouds upon the covenantee 's titie,
which in order to give him an unembarrassed title
it is necessary to ha\'e removed, and he accordingly files a bill to remove such outstanding claims
as clouds upon his title, if he is successful therein
he is not entitled to recover the ('r;sts mid expense;
of the suit and damag-es for the breach of cove·
nant either of seisin or of warranty since such
claims haYing been adjudicated faYorably to the
coYenantee, do not constitute a hrcaeh of snrh
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eo en au ts. (Citing Luther v. Brown, GG
Appeal 227)" (Italics added)
Uur statule, 8ec. 37-1-12, U.C.A. 1933, codifies the
rnle above stated by those authorities wherein it fixes
the liability of a grantor in a warranty deed as follows:
" . . . and that the grantor . . . will forever
warrant and defend the title thereof in the grantee . . . agaiust all lawful claims whatsoever".
(Italics added)
lll this action the attorney's fees were incurred in
ulitaiuiug quitdaim deeds from the adjoining owners on
the East, George and 1£dith Ferguson, and quitclaim
Jeeds au<l two safo;factions of judgment from the adjoi11i11g uwuer::; 011 the South, the Estate of Harriet
Alpaugh, deceased, and Tad Aoki, her contract purdiat:>el'. K Cll1e d these landowners had ever made any
l'laim tu the subject property, let aloue any lawful claim
1d1ich 8ec. 57-1-12 requires. There has never been any
aclju<lica tiuu or determination in this action or any other
adiun that any of these adjoining owners had as much
col:1r of title to any part of the subject property, let
alo11e the paramount title which our statute requires
before imposing liability on the grantor. Gerald Creason,
ouc of the re8poudents, admitted that uo one had disturbed his possessicu in any way or made any claim to
aay of the property within the fern·es. (R.71) Indeed,
!he adjoining owners on the South, the Estate of Harriet
.\Jpangli, dceea8ed, was the appellant8' grantor and it
1·oulcl not legally make any claim to property which she
had c·onveyed to them in 1943 by warranty deed, aml
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which ;;arne pn,1rnrty appellant;; haJ eonveyeJ to resp 011
Jents iu lUG;J. ln any rnse of conilict between the twu
tracts of lawl, the title to the wuject prnperty woul<l ()[
neces;;ity be paramount to the tract 011 the South whitli
;;he retaineJ. On the l!}ast, the true deed line according
to re;;pondeub' L,\vn ;;urveyor, was to 3 feet im;ide the
fence line, ;,;o there \ms no problem there. (Exh. l'-:JJ
But e\-ell if one of the adjoining landowner;,; had madl
;;ome claim to a portivn of the sul>ject property and had
hrcught suit tu quiet title tu that portion, and the respo11<lent;; were required to <lefeml 8UCh action, re8pon<len1,
(·ould not reco,·er attorney's fees under the covewrnb
uules8 their defense of sneh quiet title aetion ,,·as u11suc·
<·essful arnl t lie adjoiuing owner ;;ncl'ceded in obtainini:
part of the 8nhject property by being able tu prove thal
title \vas paramount.
How, then, could the lower court a ward re8pondenl'
attorney's fees for "clearing clouds" by obtaining quitclaim deeds, when it could not have given them attorney's
fee8 fer su<:ce8;;fully defending a quiet title action'!
61 A.L.R 169, supra. Only when an adjoining owner with
a paramount title takes part of the laud conveyed to the
grantee away from him can he he heard to <'omplain anJ
recover from his grantor attorney's fees incn rred in th1·
u11sm·cessful defense of the title conveyed. So held thi'
r'ourt in Yan Cott v. Jacklin,
l1tah 412, 226 Pac. 460
Furthermore, the attack on the title must he a direct
attack. It is insufficient that the title is found unmarkel·
ahle. 61 A.L.R. 169; Hilliker v. Rueg-er, 228 N.Y. 11, 120
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.\.K 2!jC; Hoffman v. Dickson, 65 Wash. 53G, 118 Pac.
:20 A: L J ur. :2d, Sec. 150 on Uovenants.
There has l1ee11, of course, no determination or adjuJic;atiou that any of the adjoining owners from whom the
4uitdaim deeds were acquired had paramount title. Respomlents' counsel in the trial court admitted in a
iucmorandum written by him that none of the owners
on the Nouth or East "asserted a11y lawful claims" and
that ''it is ·obvious that no11e of the adjoining owners to
the East and South had title paramount to plaintiffs
[rec:pornle11ts] ''. (R.42) He further cunceded:
.. J>laiutiffs agree that attorney's fees should
not Lie allowed with respect to unlawful claims
and thus, efforts to vbtain land to the South and
East are not properly includable as damages in
a hreaeh of warranty aetion''. (R.41)
In that memorandum he sought to justify the award
of fees 011 the ground that Ereksou had title to the 4.5
loot strip i\mth of the ol.cl fence line. We have already
pointed L;Ut iu Point IV of this brief that respondents
ca1111ot maintain an action for breach of covenants until
the!' have determined that question with Erekson.
But even if eounsel were correct that Erekson had title
to part of the land conveyed by appellants to responthe attorney's fees \Yere incurred in obtaining
qniklaim deeds from the owners to the South and East,
am] "ere not incurred in litigating or even negotiating
with E;reksou. Counsel for respondents testified at the
trial (R.112) that he probably spent "five minutes" in
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llealing with 1'.:rekt:wn. 'l'hus, \\'hether Ereks'Jll h<>rl pai:
mount title ur not tu the strip orth of the fenee, respon
dents spent 110 time or money in attempting to obtaii1
possession uf it. 'l'hey would Le entitled to n'Othing more
than nominal damages. In the court below,
relie<l upon the case of Van Cott \'.Jacklin, supra. There,
the fees awar<le<l to the grantee had been incurred bi
him in a prior unsuccessful lawsuit with one Casper, au
adj1oini11g owner, to obtain possession of part of the laud
conveyed to the grantee. lt was adjudicated in that suil
between Van Cott and Casper, that Casper had the
paramount title. See Yan Cott v. Casper, 5;3 Utah 161.
llli Pae. 849. Therefore, in the subsequent aetion broughl
by Yau Cott against his grautor, J ackliu, this court required Jacklin to indemnify his grantee fur the attorney's fees incurred in the unsuecessful suit with Casper.
The Van Cott v. Jaeklin rule has 11'0 applieation Len
because respondents have had no litigation with Erekso11
who they elaimed had paramount title to 4.5 feet of land
conveyed to them l>y appeHants, and admitted to spending only "five minutes" in approaehing him. Instead.
they took the laud enelosed by fences South of the old
North fence (thereby picking up G87 square feet more
than they had bargained for), but yet in this action were
awarded attorney's fees incurred in obtaining quitclaim
deeds from people who they admit did not have parn
mount title, (H.42) and in face of their counsel's con·
cession that "efforts to obtain land to the South and
East are not properly includable as damages in a hreacn
of warranty action". ( R.41)
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l

it'arly, there is uo basis for the award of attorney's

lees in th is action by the trial court to respondents.

POINT VI.
'fHJ:: AWARD UF $7:20.00 AT'l'ORNEY'S l!'EES
\\'AS EXCE81SIYE AND UKREASONABLE.

Respondents' eouusel at the trial testified of his time
and efforts iu behalf of his clients. He said it added up to
SO homs of work (R.103) He multiplied it by his hourly
rate and came up with $750.00 in fees. (R.104) The court
awarded him $720.00. Appellants believe, of course, that
there has been no breach of covenants and no amount
uf attorney's fees should have been awarded. In the
e\·ent, howeYer, this court determines that respondnts
are entitled to attorney's fees, we believe $720.00 was
rxcessive for his efforts in "clearing the title", which
notl1ing more than obtaining three quitclaim deeds
and two satisfactions of judgment. (R.113) We do not
U.oubt that counsel expended 80 hours in behalf of his
dients. Most of his time, however, was spent in connectiou with respondents' sale of the subject property to
the Sievert Brothers and in pursuit of other matters not
related to "C'lcaring the title", and for which appellants
('OUltl not be charged. For exampile, at R.93 he testified,
"T neg-otiated at some length with :Mr. Vuyk on behalf
of the contract purchasers. "\Ye exchanged a number of
letters, many, many telephone eonYersations ". Again, at
R.9i he testified, "I obtained a quitclaim deed from Mr.
Creason and his wife in favor of the Hallmark Construct on;, which had been the contract seller to the Sieverts,
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tu remo\'e that question''. Again, at R.91' he
'' l prepared a warranty deed for the signature of Mr.
and Mrs. Creason and Hallmark Constructor1>, Iuc., c
Utah corporation", which deed was in favor of the
vert Brothers. His testimony on direct examination wa,
replete with reforenees to matters which he pursued fur
his elients, which had nothing to do with "elearing the
title" .....
are not liable for his time in dealiu"e
with the Sievert Brothers, in eorresponding with and
telephoning their attorneys, in preparing quitclaim deeds
for Mr. and ..\lrs. Creason to convey the property to Hallmark Constructors, or for preparing a warranty <lee<l
from Mr. and Mrs. Creason and Hallmark Constructor,
to the Sievert Brothers. At R.94 he testified that it
18 months after he was engaged by Mr. Creason that he
prepared the quiklaim deeds whieh were to be signed by
..\Irs. Alpaugh and 1\lr. Aoki, owners to the 8'outh. He
asserted that the great majority of his time was spent in
tloing the title work, obtaining surveys and ascertaining
who had judgments on the property. (R.113) Yet when
probed un cross-examination he admitted, however, he
had a title eomµauy 1>earch the records and giYe him a
preliminary title report; that he personally did not have ·
to search any reeords; that Bush & Gudgell, surveyors,
provided him with legal descriptions to use in the quitclaim deeds; that thereafter it was largely a secretarial
task in preparing the three deeds; (R.113) that the two
deeds for Alpaugh and Aoki were mailed to appellants'
<'ounsel (R.107), who returned the Alpaugh deed signed
(R.108), and who delivered the other deed to Aoki.
l
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1 hat he had to walk over the ground with Aoki
explain it to him before he would sign. (R.114) He
i'urlher testified he euuld not liave spent more than one
hour dealing with the Fergusons, owners on the East, or
preparing quitelaim deeds for their signatures. (R.112)
Ile spent five minutes with Arion Erekson. (R.112)
\

! 1·5)

lt is obvious from his testimony that very little of
the 1-!U hours time was spent in preparing and obtaining
on the three quitclaim deeds which he claimed
were necessary to clear the title. (He did not include any
time for serviees rendered in the instant breach of warranty law suit (R.115), which, of course, he could not
.-.incc attorney's fees for bringing a breach of \Varranty
acti•o11 arc not recoverable from the grantor. Van Cott
1· .•J aeklin, :rnpra.) To impose $7:20.00 upon the appellants
for his serviees in obtaining the quitclaim deeds and
satisfactions of judgment is unreasonable. From his
own testimony it is difficult to see how he could have
expewled more than 25 hours in meaningful work reasrelated to "clearing the title". At his hourly rate
of $10.00 (R.104) that would g1.ve him $250.00. Had he
brought a quiet title action against the adjoining owners,
the recommended fee by the Utah Bar Association is
as set forth in the Utah State Bar advisory handbook on offi('e management ancl fees. His time in obtaining tl1e quitclaim deed from Ferguson is not properly
assessahle against the appellants heeause the strip aC'quired from Fergm;on was beyond the deed line and by
no strf'teli of the imagination C'an appellants be respon,;ihle for attempts t.o secure land in excess of that actually
desnihe<l in the deed.
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CONCLUSION
Hespondents received title an<l possession to tbe for
they intended to purchase and pleasantly found it.I
fences encompassed a greater area than they had bargained fur. No outsider made any claim to any part of
it, but because a surveyor using modern instruments and
apparently measuring from a recently established monument, questioned by a few feet the location of the North
line, respondents disregarded 88 years of practical location and set on a course leading to the unnecessary expenditure of their time and money. They erroneously
concluded that they should have a strip possessed by
Erekson, but without pursuing tliat matter to a conclusion with him, they prematurely filed this action for
breach of warranty against their grantors. They han
failed to establish a breach of warranty and have totally
failed to show that they expended any attorney's
in the unsuccessful defense of the title conveyed. The·
juggment entered below cannot stand on the facts or the
law. It should be reversed and appellants awarded their
costs.
Respectfully submitted,

RICHARD C. HOWE
5055 South State Street
Murray, Utah
Attorney for Appellants
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